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PROCREATIVE AUTONOMY IN 
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTS 
Vanessa Nahigian* 
 
          With the growing practice of gestational surrogacy, many women 
bear children with whom they have no genetic relationship, allowing 
intended parents to have children of their own when they are otherwise 
unable to do so. This practice, however, creates a ripple in the abortion 
debate. This Note addresses procreative autonomy in the context of 
gestational surrogacy agreements, examines the underlying 
constitutional interests at stake for each party involved, and suggests a 
solution to fill California’s current statutory void. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today, thousands of children in America are born to women with 
whom they have no genetic relationship.1 With the help of in vitro 
fertilization technology, women may bear children for others, who 
previously could not have children of their own, through the practice 
of gestational surrogacy.2 However, as the practice grows more 
prevalent, the legal uncertainty that comes with it amplifies. 
One area of uncertainty concerns the possibility that either the 
surrogate or the intended parents will change their mind and seek to 
terminate the pregnancy. Even where a surrogacy arrangement is 
memorialized in contract, and despite greater regulation of such 
agreements, conflicts over the surrogate’s right to determine whether 
or not to abort a pregnancy may arise and are fraught with emotion.3 
Consider a couple that is unable to have a child of their own and 
enlists the help of a gestational surrogate. The parties enter into a 
contract that complies with the statutory requirements under current 
California law, and the intended mother’s embryos are implanted in 
the surrogate. After the surrogate’s pregnancy is confirmed, the 
intended parents experience financial loss. Unable to bear the cost of 
the surrogacy and the resulting child, they ask the surrogate to 
terminate the pregnancy, and she refuses. 
Alternatively, consider a situation where the same parties enter 
into a valid surrogacy contract. After the surrogate’s pregnancy is 
confirmed, she expresses intent to terminate the pregnancy for 
personal reasons. The intended parents oppose the abortion and 
attempt to require her to carry the pregnancy to term. 
The current California statutory scheme for enforcing gestational 
surrogacy agreements is silent as to what extent the intended parents 
may control procreative decision making throughout the parties’ 
contractual relationship.4 Increasingly, parties may try to address these 
scenarios in the surrogacy agreement, but questions nonetheless arise 
 
 1. See MAGDALINA GUGUCHEVA, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY IN 
AMERICA, 10–11 (2010), http://thetarrytownmeetings.org/sites/default/files/Surrogacy%20in%20 
America%20Report. 
 2. See id. at 3; Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 3. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); C.M. v. M.C., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351 
(Ct. App. 2017). 
 4. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2019). 
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about whether such provisions are enforceable.5 Therefore, whether a 
contract contains provisions purporting to limit the surrogate’s right to 
make procreative decisions, or a contract is silent on the topic, a court 
in either of the aforementioned scenarios would be forced to determine 
with which party the ultimate procreative decision should lie. 
While federal and state law clearly recognizes a woman’s right to 
procreative autonomy, which includes the right to decide whether to 
terminate a pregnancy,6 the scope of this right may be less clear when 
the woman is a surrogate who contracted to carry another person’s 
child. In such a scenario, both parties attempt to exercise competing 
procreative rights. 
This Note addresses these conflicting interests in gestational 
surrogacy contracts and examines two gestational surrogacy 
scenarios: one in which the intended parents seek an abortion, and 
another in which the surrogate seeks an abortion. This Note analyzes 
the underlying protections conferred on each party and relevant 
jurisprudence to determine which party’s interests would prevail. 
California law, coupled with federal law, provides maximum 
protection for the surrogate’s right to decide whether to terminate a 
pregnancy, regardless of the intended parents’ wishes or a contractual 
obligation. This likely forecloses any legislative or contractual attempt 
to limit this right. Nonetheless, this Note proposes that California 
amend its statute to address the current regulatory void, which creates 
uncertainty about liability for breach of contract in the event a 
surrogate’s decision conflicts with the intended parents’ expectations, 
which can undermine surrogacy arrangements and potentially allow 
de facto coercion of the surrogate despite her legal rights. 
Part II of this Note describes the development of surrogacy law 
in California, including its statutory scheme for the enforcement of 
surrogacy contracts. Part III examines the various constitutional 
interests at stake in conflicts between surrogates and intended parents, 
including procreative autonomy, bodily integrity, and the right against 
involuntary servitude, and applies those principles to the gestational 
surrogacy scenarios. 
Finally, Part IV proposes that the California legislature should 
clarify current surrogacy law and adopt the 2017 Uniform Parentage 
 
 5. Deborah L. Forman, Abortion Clauses in Surrogacy Contracts: Insights from a Case 
Study, 49 FAM. L.Q. 29, 33–34 (2015). 
 6. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Act, while recognizing the potential shortcomings of the act as it 
attempts to protect the procreative rights of the surrogate. The 
prominence of surrogacy has complicated the concept of motherhood 
and the rights associated. Thus, clarification of those rights in the 
context of gestational surrogacy is necessary to minimize disputes, 
protect the parties involved, and further the practice as a whole. 
II.  HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SURROGACY LAW 
A.  The Growing Practice of Gestational Surrogacy 
The concept of surrogacy is hardly a novel one, as stories of 
surrogacy date back to biblical times.7 In the book of Genesis, Sarah 
could not bear children for her husband, Abraham.8 The couple turned 
to their servant, Hagar, to bear Abraham’s child, and by her, Ishmael 
was born.9 This is perhaps the first story of a “traditional” surrogacy, 
in which the surrogate mother agrees to become impregnated using 
her own egg.10 In this context, the surrogate is the “biological, genetic, 
and gestational mother” of the child.11 The more modern term for this 
type of surrogacy is “genetic surrogacy,” which is defined by the 
California legislature as “a woman who agrees to gestate an embryo, 
in which the woman is the gamete donor and the embryo was created 
using the sperm of the intended father or a donor arranged by the 
intended parent or parents.”12 
With the help of assisted reproductive technology, however, 
surrogates may bear children with whom they have no genetic 
relationship.13 The practice of surrogacy has drastically evolved with 
the invention of in vitro fertilization technology (IVF).14 IVF is 
believed to be the most effective form of assisted reproductive 
technology in which mature eggs are fertilized in a lab and implanted 
in the uterus.15 The process is used to treat infertility and genetic 
 
 7. Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 926. 
 8. Genesis 16:2. 
 9. Genesis 16:15. 
 10. GUGUCHEVA, supra note 1, at 6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7960(f)(1) (West 2016). 
 13. Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2016); see GUGUCHEVA, supra note 
1, at 6. 
 14. Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 926. 
 15. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC (June 22, 2019), 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/basics/definition/prc-20018905. 
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problems, but is also used to implant fertilized eggs into a gestational 
carrier.16 By this process, intended parents, who are otherwise unable 
to have their own child, may do so through a gestational carrier.17 This 
is referred to as “gestational surrogacy,” a term also adopted in 
California’s statutory scheme, and defined as a woman “who agrees to 
gestate an embryo that is genetically unrelated to her pursuant to an 
assisted reproduction agreement.”18 California’s regulatory scheme 
refers specifically to gestational carriers, and California courts have 
interpreted the legislature’s failure to mention traditional surrogacy as 
an indication that traditional surrogacy agreements will not be 
protected under the law.19 
While the statistics tracking gestational surrogacy are limited, 
they reveal that the market for these arrangements is growing 
exponentially with no signs of slowing.20 The number of babies in 
America born via gestational surrogacy doubled between 2004 and 
2008, resulting in a total of 5,238 babies.21 The Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention estimates that, as of 2007, 19,218 births in 
California and 137,482 births nationwide have resulted from 
gestational surrogacy agreements.22 These statistics continue to rise, 
despite the risks involved with gestational surrogacy agreements.23 
In addition to those commonly associated with pregnancy, there 
are many other potential health risks that come with gestational 
surrogacy.24 Throughout the IVF process, surrogates undergo 
intensive hormonal treatments, which makes it more likely that the 
surrogate will suffer from harmful side effects.25 Furthermore, it is 
common practice during IVF to implant multiple embryos in order to 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7960(f)(2) (West 2016). 
 19. Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 927 n.7; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2017). In fact, only a very small minority of states expressly allow and statutorily protect traditional, 
or genetic, surrogacy agreements. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8. Those states that do allow the 
practice distinguish it from gestational surrogacy, impose further restrictions, and allow the 
surrogate to withdraw consent to the agreement after impregnation. Id. (citing D.C. CODE § 16-411 
(2017) (permitting withdrawal of consent forty-eight hours after birth) and FLA. STAT. § 63.213 
(2012) (permitting withdrawal of consent forty-eight hours after birth)). 
 20. See GUGUCHEVA, supra note 1, at 7. 
 21. Id. 
 22.   Id. at 10–11. 
 23. See, e.g., Kiran M. Perkins et al., Trends and Outcomes of Gestational Surrogacy in the 
United States, 106 FERTILITY & STERILITY 435, 435 (2016).  
 24. GUGUCHEVA, supra note 1, at 17–19. 
 25. Id. at 21–22. 
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improve pregnancy chances, which often results in multiple 
pregnancies.26 This heightens the risks associated with pregnancy 
generally, and threatens the health of the babies that result, as 60 
percent of multiple pregnancy babies are delivered prematurely.27 
Unfortunately, the above-mentioned risks are not the only 
complications that gestational surrogates face—in conjunction with 
health risks, there is considerable potential for significant financial and 
legal liability as well. While legal representation is required for both 
parties to a surrogacy contract, many surrogates do not have the 
financial resources for independent counsel; they risk facing the 
burden of expensive medical procedures, and in some extreme cases, 
an unwanted child.28 Despite these risks, parties continue to enter into 
surrogacy contracts with limited legal protection, leading to conflicts 
that courts are forced to resolve. 
B.  California’s Legal Framework for Gestational Surrogacy 
For the first time, in 1993, the California Supreme Court held that 
gestational surrogacy agreements are enforceable.29 The decision 
came in Johnson v. Calvert,30 in which a married couple entered into 
a gestational surrogacy contract with another woman.31 After relations 
between the parties deteriorated, the surrogate mother threatened to 
keep and raise the child herself.32 The intended parents then filed a 
lawsuit seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of the 
unborn child.33 The Johnson court, relying on the Uniform Parentage 
Act (UPA), found that the surrogate was not the natural mother of the 
child and granted legal parentage to the intended parents.34 
California adopted the UPA in 1975.35 The UPA defined the 
parent and child relationship as “the legal relationship existing 
between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which 
the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and 
 
 26. Id. at 23. 
 27. Id. 
 28. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2019); GUGUCHEVA, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
 29. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 30. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 31. Id. at 777–78. 
 32. Id. at 778. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. at 778–79. 
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obligations.”36 The UPA created a legal relationship encompassing 
two types of parents, “natural” and “adoptive.”37 The UPA clearly did 
not contemplate the existence of gestational parentage, which was 
made a reality by the development of IVF technology, in gestational 
surrogacy arrangements.38 However, the Johnson court stated that the 
UPA facially applies to any parentage determination, including that of 
motherhood.39 The court concluded: 
[A]lthough the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity 
and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child 
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one 
woman, she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she 
who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she 
intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under 
California law.40 
Thus, the intended mother, or “natural mother,” was granted legal 
parentage. 
The court in Johnson further held that the agreement was not, on 
its face, inconsistent with public policy so as to be unenforceable.41 
The surrogate mother argued that the contract violated adoption 
policies because it constituted a pre-birth waiver of her parental 
rights.42 The court was unpersuaded, however, and found that the 
payments under the contract were meant to compensate the surrogate 
for her “services in gestating the fetus and undergoing labor, rather 
than for giving up ‘parental’ rights to the child.”43 
The surrogate and commentators further argued that the contract 
was unenforceable on several public policy grounds. One argument 
contended that such contracts tended to “exploit or dehumanize 
women,” particularly those of lower economic status.44 The court, 
finding the contrary, reasoned: 
 
 36. Id. at 779. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 39. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. 
 40. Id. at 782. 
 41. Id. at 783. 
 42. Id. at 783–84 (“[The surrogate] urges that surrogacy contracts violate several social 
policies. Relying on her contention that she is the child’s legal, natural mother, she cites the public 
policy embodied in Penal Code section 273, prohibiting the payment for consent to adoption of a 
child. She argues further that the policies underlying the adoption laws of this state are violated by 
the surrogacy contract because it in effect constitutes a pre-birth waiver of her parental rights.”). 
 43. Id. at 784. 
 44. Id.  
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The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and 
intelligently agree to gestate and deliver a baby for intending 
parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for centuries 
prevented women from attaining equal economic rights and 
professional status under the law. To resurrect this view is 
both to foreclose a personal and economic choice on the part 
of the surrogate mother, and to deny intending parents what 
may be their only means of procreating a child of their own 
genetic stock.45 
In deciding the case, the court in Johnson acknowledged that the 
California legislature ultimately bears the burden of resolving this 
issue.46 The landmark decision in Johnson laid the groundwork for the 
legislature to do so in 2012, when it passed California Family Code 
section 7962.47 
1.  Section 7962 
California Family Code section 7962 presently governs 
gestational surrogacy contracts in California and provides certain 
specifications to make those contracts enforceable.48 The statute 
requires that such contracts contain the following information: 
1. The date the contract was executed; 
2. The names of the persons from which the gametes (ova and 
sperm) originated, unless anonymously donated; 
3. The name(s) of the intended parent(s); and 
4. Disclosure of how the medical expenses of the surrogate and 
the pregnancy will be handled, including a review of 
applicable health insurance coverage and what liabilities, if 
any, that may fall on the surrogate.49 
It further requires that both the intended parents and surrogate are 
represented by independent legal counsel and that the agreement must 
be fully executed in accordance with the statute before any medical 
preparation or embryo transfer.50 Upon proof that the agreement 
complies with section 7962, the court will establish legal parentage of 
 
 45. Id. at 785. 
 46. Id. at 784. 
 47. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2019); Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 925 
(C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 48. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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the intended parents and terminate all rights and duties of the surrogate 
without further hearings or evidence, unless a party to the agreement 
has a good faith, reasonable belief that the contract was not properly 
executed.51 
Notably, the statute fails to provide a framework for determining 
the rights of the surrogate or intended parents to make important 
healthcare decisions, especially in the event of a conflict.52 Further, 
the statute is silent as to the parties’ rights to make procreative 
decisions, as well as the extent to which the surrogacy contract can 
limit a party’s procreative decision making.53 Recent disputes have 
exemplified the need for clarity in this area. 
2.  Abortion Disputes in Surrogacy Contracts 
In a recent California case, C.M. v. M.C.,54 an intended father 
sought the help of a career surrogate to have children.55 Due to the 
surrogate’s age of forty-seven, three fertilized embryos were 
implanted in the surrogate at the request of the intended father, and the 
surrogate became pregnant with triplets.56 The relationship between 
the two deteriorated quickly after the intended father requested that 
the surrogate abort one of the fetuses, otherwise known as a “selective 
reduction.”57 The surrogate refused, and the intended father alleged 
that by refusing to reduce, she was in breach of contract and liable for 
damages thereunder.58 
This specific issue was not brought before the California courts, 
and the intended father filed the requisite paperwork to establish his 
legal parentage.59 In response, the surrogate filed claims in both state 
and federal courts, claiming that section 7962 violated her and the 
babies’ due process rights and violated state and federal laws.60 
Ultimately, she sought “the end of recognized, binding surrogacy 
contracts in the State of California.”61 Both the state and federal courts 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351 (Ct. App. 2017). 
 55. Id. at 354. 
 56. Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 57. Id. at 928–29. 
 58. Id. at 929. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 932. 
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dismissed the surrogate’s claims, with the California Court of Appeal 
finding that the agreement complied with statutory requirements, 
thereby precluding the surrogate’s claims.62 
The intended father’s claim that the surrogate’s refusal to comply 
with his request for selective reduction constituted a breach of contract 
begs the question of whether decisions regarding termination of 
pregnancy can be contracted to. This dispute embodies the sensitive 
nature of surrogacy agreements and the many issues that can arise. 
In practice, surrogacy contracts typically contain provisions 
governing the termination of the pregnancy, which commonly address 
anticipated issues, such as birth defects or a multiple pregnancy.63 For 
example, in a Connecticut case concerning a surrogate’s refusal to 
terminate a pregnancy, the contract in question contained the 
following provision: 
Abortion and Selective Reduction due to severe fetus 
abnormality: The Gestational Carrier agrees to selective fetus 
[sic] reduction or/and abortion in case of severe fetus [sic] 
abnormality as determined by 3-dimentional [sic] ultrasound 
test with following pathology expertise, or by any other 
procedure or test(s) used to diagnose sever[sic] fetus 
abnormality.64 
Further, the contract purportedly limited the surrogate’s right to 
terminate the pregnancy to life-threatening situations.65 This is also 
common, as surrogacy contracts typically purport to preclude abortion 
without the consent of the intended parents.66 While practitioners 
generally advocate for the inclusion of such clauses, questions remain 
as to whether such clauses are enforceable by specific performance or 
whether breach of these clauses would create liability for damages.67 
These examples show that the right to terminate a pregnancy 
becomes increasingly complex in the context of gestational surrogacy 
agreements. When multiple parties are necessary to produce a child, 
procreative rights can conflict between those parties. California 
surrogacy law does not address this kind of conflict. In fact, the court 
 
 62. See C.M. v. M.C., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351, 354 (Ct. App. 2017); see also Cook, 190 F. Supp. 
3d at 925 (dismissing the surrogate’s claims with prejudice). 
 63. Forman, supra note 5, at 33–34. 
 64. Forman, supra note 5, at 34.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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in Johnson stated that it “need not determine the validity of a 
surrogacy contract purporting to deprive the gestator of her freedom 
to terminate the pregnancy,” because the contract at issue specifically 
reserved the surrogate’s right to terminate the pregnancy.68 In light of 
the increasing market for gestational surrogacy, as well as recent 
disputes, California courts and lawmakers will inevitably be forced to 
make a decision regarding whose rights prevail in the event that one 
party seeks an abortion at the objection of the other. Specifically, they 
must decide whether the intended parents may enforce a gestational 
surrogacy agreement by requiring the surrogate to submit to an 
abortion against her will, or conversely, may enjoin the surrogate from 
obtaining an abortion. 
III.  PROCREATIVE RIGHTS IN GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTS 
A.  Relevant Constitutional Interests at Stake in Conflicts 
Between the Surrogate and Intended Parents 
In 1942, the Supreme Court recognized the right to procreate as a 
fundamental human right in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.69 
The Supreme Court later acknowledged a woman’s right to 
procreative autonomy as vital to the right of privacy under the 
Constitution in its landmark decision in Roe v. Wade.70 The California 
courts and legislature have further expanded this right to provide even 
broader protections of procreative autonomy.71 Thus, California 
citizens enjoy the protection of both the rights to procreate and not to 
procreate. 
Surrogacy arrangements are a means to exercise one’s right to 
procreate. However, when one party seeks to terminate the ensuing 
pregnancy, but the other does not, the constitutional interests of both 
parties compete. Thus, in order to determine which party should retain 
the right to choose whether to terminate the pregnancy, the question 
becomes which party’s rights prevail over the other’s. This inquiry 
encompasses procreative autonomy, bodily integrity, and risks against 
involuntary servitude. Further, the analysis depends on which party 
seeks to terminate the pregnancy. 
 
 68. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993). 
 69. See 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 70. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 71. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 800–05 (Cal. 1997). 
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1.  Procreative Autonomy 
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court of the United States 
overturned a Texas law that effectively banned abortions in all but life-
threatening situations and recognized that the right of privacy, implicit 
in the Constitution, encompasses a woman’s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy.72 This central holding in Roe was later affirmed by the 
Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,73 which adopted a clear test for assessing the 
constitutionality of state laws that regulate abortion.74 The Court 
recognized that the state has a profound interest in potential life and 
accommodated that interest by adopting the “undue burden” analysis, 
which makes a law invalid “if its purpose or effect is to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before 
the fetus attains viability.”75 
While the decision in Casey narrowed the Roe holding at the 
federal level, California courts have adhered to an abortion framework 
more consistent with the decision in Roe.76 In American Academy of 
Pediatrics v. Lungren,77 the California Supreme Court noted that the 
California Constitution contains, in article I, section 1, an explicit 
guarantee of the right to privacy, which is markedly broader than that 
provided by the United States Constitution.78 Thus, in the gestational 
surrogacy scenario, the surrogate retains an even broader protection of 
procreative autonomy under California law. 
a.  Subjecting procreative decisions to third parties 
Importantly, the courts in both Casey and Lungren examined the 
constitutionality of statutes that condition the right to receive an 
abortion on the consent of a third party.79 These decisions have 
significant implications in the context of gestational surrogacy. 
Courts have repeatedly been faced with the question of whether a 
woman’s procreative decisions may be subject to an approval or veto 
 
 72. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 164. 
 73. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 74. See id. at 878–79. 
 75. Id. at 878. 
 76. See Lungren, 940 P.2d at 808. 
 77. 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–95 (finding statutes requiring spousal notification 
unconstitutional); Lungren 940 P.2d at 800. 
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by another party, such as the pregnant woman’s spouse, or the parents 
of a pregnant minor.80 The Court in Casey stated: 
What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate 
decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing 
so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural 
mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a 
minor, may express profound respect for the life of the 
unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to 
the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.81 
 The Casey Court addressed statutes requiring spousal approval 
and categorically held that spousal notification or consent provisions 
are likely to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an 
abortion, creating an undue burden.82 However, the Court reaffirmed 
that a state may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the 
consent of a parent or a judicial bypass of such a requirement.83 
In contrast, the California Supreme Court, applying its broader 
protection of the right of privacy, struck down a law requiring parental 
consent in Lungren.84 The court in Lungren noted that a provision that 
would condition a woman’s right to obtain an abortion on the consent 
of another person, spouse or otherwise, “clearly would intrude upon 
the woman’s right, as an individual, to retain personal control over the 
fundamental autonomy interests involved in the decision whether to 
continue or to terminate her pregnancy.”85 Thus, significantly, 
California’s broad protection of procreative autonomy precludes other 
parties from controlling abortion decisions. 
b.  Extending procreative autonomy to non-pregnant parties 
The protection of procreative autonomy was originally 
recognized in the context of a woman who was pregnant or would 
become pregnant.86 Some state courts have, however, extended that 
protection to parties other than a pregnant woman.87 This is especially 
 
 80. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–95; Lungren, 940 P.2d at 800. 
 81. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 82. Id. at 893. 
 83. Id. at 899. 
 84. See Lungren, 940 P.2d at 814. 
 85. Id. at 813. 
 86. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120–21 (1973). 
 87. See In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 581 (Colo. 2018); see also Davis v. Davis, 
842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the preferences of both progenitors must be 
considered when resolving disputes regarding the pre-embryos produced by in vitro fertilization). 
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prevalent in the context of pre-embryo disposition cases.88 For 
example, in In re Marriage of Rooks,89 a married couple had 
cryogenically preserved pre-embryos for the purpose of impregnating 
the wife through IVF but never made an agreement as to the 
disposition of those embryos in the event that they divorced.90 When 
the couple did later file for divorce, they battled over the use of those 
pre-embryos.91 The wife, believing she could no longer have children 
naturally, sought to preserve the pre-embryos for future implantation, 
whereas the husband wished to discard them, as he did not want more 
children from the marriage.92 The Supreme Court of Colorado 
acknowledged the difficulty of resolving the dispute, noting that “it 
pits one spouse’s right to procreate directly against the other spouse’s 
equivalently important right to avoid procreation.”93 The court held 
that, absent an agreement between the parties, courts should follow an 
interest balancing approach to determine the disposition of the pre-
embryos, noting that this approach is informed by the underlying 
principle of autonomy over reproductive decisions.94 Significantly, 
under this framework, the court gave equal weight to one party’s right 
not to procreate and the other party’s right to procreate, stating that 
both spouses have equally valid, constitutionally based interests in 
procreative autonomy.95 
In Davis v. Davis,96 the Supreme Court of Tennessee followed 
this approach in a similar dispute, in which, after divorce, the wife 
sought to use pre-frozen embryos against the will of her husband.97 In 
adopting the interest balancing test, the court noted that procreative 
autonomy is “composed of two rights of equal significance—the right 
to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.”98 Because the court 
treated the rights as equal, it considered the effects and subsequent 
burdens of barring each party’s procreative autonomy.99 The court 
 
 88. See In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d at 581; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. 
 89. 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018). 
 90. Id. at 581−83. 
 91. Id. at 583. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 581. 
 94. Id. at 593. 
 95. See id. at 594. 
 96. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 97. Id. at 589. 
 98. Id. at 601. 
 99. Id. at 603−04. 
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considered the use to which the parties intended to put the embryos, 
and contemplated the fact that the wife did not intend to use the 
embryos for self-implantation, but rather sought to donate them to 
another couple.100 The court stated that refusal to permit the donation 
of the pre-embryos would impose on the wife the burden of knowing 
that the lengthy IVF process she endured was futile, and that her pre-
embryos would never become children.101 While recognizing that this 
was a substantial emotional burden, the court found that it was not as 
substantial as the husband’s interest in avoiding parenthood.102 
Ultimately, the husband was awarded custody of the pre-embryos; 
however, the court noted that the case would have been different if the 
wife wished to use the pre-embryos herself, but only if she could not 
otherwise achieve parenthood.103 
While California courts have yet to address this issue, the court in 
Hecht v. Superior Court104 relied on Davis in other regards, and noted 
that the Davis balancing test would be pertinent if conflicting intent 
was present as to the disposition of pre-embryos.105 In a surrogacy 
scenario, this is significant when the intended parents seek to 
terminate the pregnancy, as was the case in C.M. v. M.C., when the 
intended father attempted to assert a right not to procreate by 
requesting that the surrogate terminate one of the three pregnancies.106 
2.  Bodily Integrity 
In addition to procreative autonomy, the right to bodily integrity 
is crucial to the discussion of the right to choose whether to terminate 
a pregnancy. This fundamental right guarantees to every individual 
“the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint 
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority 
of law.”107 It thus effectively protects a person from being forced to 
undergo any medical or surgical procedure against his or her will.108 
 
 100. Id. at 604. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 105. See id. at 858–59 n.9 (relying on Davis as to the characterization of preserved sperm and 
noting that, while it was premature to rely on the Davis interest balancing test, the test would be 
pertinent if the intent of the parties conflicted). 
 106. See C.M. v. M.C., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351, 356 (Ct. App. 2017). 
 107. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 108. See id. at 257. 
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In Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford,109 the Supreme Court 
recognized the right to bodily integrity and held that a woman could 
not be forced to undergo a surgical examination.110 Similarly, the court 
in McFall v. Shimp111 refused to order the defendant to donate bone 
marrow in order to save the plaintiff’s life, stating that “[t]he common 
law has consistently held to a rule which provides that one human 
being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save 
another human being or to rescue.”112 The right to bodily integrity has 
been further recognized by the California Supreme Court in Thor v. 
Superior Court,113 which held that an inmate could not be forced to 
undergo lifesaving medical treatment after making a competent, 
informed decision to refuse such treatment.114 The right to bodily 
integrity is especially significant in the context of a gestational 
surrogacy contract, where the surrogate provides a service with her 
body. 
B.  Application of These Principles in Each Conflict Scenario 
1.  A Surrogate’s Right to Deny an Abortion 
Consider the scenario in which the intended parents wish to 
terminate the pregnancy, but the surrogate refuses. Here, there are 
several competing interests at stake. While the intended parents may 
argue that they have a right not to procreate, the surrogate has a 
competing right to bodily integrity.115 
a.  The intended parents’ right not to procreate 
In this scenario, the situation can be compared to the 
aforementioned pre-embryo disposition disputes, where courts have 
deemed the right to procreate equal to the right not to procreate.116 If 
the procreative autonomy rights of the intended parents are considered 
equal to that of the surrogate’s, a California court resolving this 
 
 109. 141 U.S. 250 (1891). 
 110. Id. at 251. 
 111. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978). 
 112. Id. at 91. 
 113. 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993). 
 114. See id. at 386−87. 
 115. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976); In re Marriage 
of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 586–87 (Colo. 2019); see also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1245 (D.C. 
1990) (noting that the right to bodily integrity inludes the right to refuse medical treatment). 
 116. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992). 
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dispute may turn to balancing the interests of the parties. Under this 
test, a court may find that the intended parents’ interests outweigh the 
surrogate’s, as she has no genetic relationship to the fetus and, thus, 
does not have a parentage interest, like the wife in Davis.117 
However, this dispute is necessarily complicated by the fact that 
the opposing party in this scenario is pregnant and “disposal” in this 
context would mean the termination of the pregnancy, a reality which 
the Davis balancing interests test does not confront. In fact, the court 
in Davis qualified the apparent “equivalence” of the parties’ 
procreative autonomy by recognizing that, in this pre-embryo context, 
“none of the concerns about a woman’s bodily integrity that have 
previously precluded men from controlling abortion decisions is 
applicable here.”118 With surrogacy, these concerns about a woman’s 
bodily integrity are in fact applicable. Accordingly, if courts impute 
the right not to procreate onto the intended parents in this situation, 
this right must be balanced against the right to bodily integrity of the 
pregnant surrogate. 
b.  A surrogate’s right to bodily integrity 
The right to bodily integrity works to protect the surrogate from 
being subject to unwanted medical procedures, including abortion. As 
the court noted in Davis, this right has “previously precluded men 
from controlling abortion decisions.”119 Thus, it is essential to 
consider this protection against the intended parents’ right to avoid 
procreation. The law places an extreme importance on the right to 
bodily integrity; however, as the court noted in Thor, while the right 
to bodily integrity is fundamentally compelling, it is not absolute. 
This notion that bodily integrity is not absolute has been 
particularly prevalent in maternal-fetal decision-making cases.120 
While California courts have not directly addressed the issue in the 
context of maternal-fetal decision-making, cases from other states 
guide the assumption that, in order to overcome the right to bodily 
integrity, the state’s interests must be extraordinarily substantial.121 
For example, in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital 
 
 117. Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 926–27 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 118. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. at 601. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1993); In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1242–
43; Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981). 
 121. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1246; Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458. 
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Authority,122 the Supreme Court of Georgia denied a motion to stay an 
order which ordered a pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean section, 
considered necessary to save the life of the unborn child, despite her 
lack of informed consent.123 The court found that the state’s interest in 
protecting the life of the unborn child outweighed the interests of the 
mother, where the operation would not be dangerous to the mother.124 
In a similar case, the court in In re A.C.125 noted that fetal cases 
may present an exception to the right to bodily integrity because a 
woman who has chosen to carry a pregnancy to term has a duty to 
ensure the welfare of the fetus.126 While the court did not ultimately 
decide the issue of when the state’s interest can prevail over the 
mother’s interest, it noted that a patient’s wishes should control in 
virtually all circumstances, except in such a situation with truly 
extraordinary or compelling reasons to “justify a massive intrusion 
into a person’s body, such as a cesarean section, against that person’s 
will.”127 
Here, the intended parents’ right to procreate competes with the 
surrogate’s right not to procreate and right to bodily integrity. Thus, 
the issue is whether the state may constitutionally deny the surrogate’s 
right to terminate the pregnancy in favor of the intended parents’ right 
to procreate by enforcing a contractual provision or resolving the 
dispute in a way that effectively strips the surrogate of the right to 
obtain an abortion. 
c.  The intended parents’ right to procreate 
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court recognized the right to 
procreate as a fundamental right in Skinner, when it struck down an 
Oklahoma law ordering the sterilization of habitual criminals.128 
Additionally, when the California Supreme Court approved 
gestational surrogacy contracts in Johnson, it gave legal protection to 
those enlisting the help of surrogates in order to exercise that right to 
procreate.129 However, California law remains silent on the strength 
 
 122. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). 
 123. Id. at 460. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). 
 126. Id. at 1244. 
 127. Id. at 1252. 
 128. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). 
 129. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 786 (Cal. 1993). 
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of that right in order to control the decisions of the surrogate during 
gestation. 
In its decision in Johnson, the court used a parentage framework 
to determine the enforceability of the surrogacy contract at hand.130 
The court applied the UPA in order to determine the “natural mother” 
of the child that resulted from the surrogacy arrangement.131 The court 
recognized that the intended mother was the natural mother of the 
child, reasoning: 
[A]lthough the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity 
and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child 
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one 
woman, she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she 
who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she 
intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under 
California law.132 
The court’s recognition that the natural mother is the party who 
intended the procreation, and is thus the party exercising her right to 
procreate, seems to suggest that she may retain the right to make 
procreative decisions throughout the gestational period, including the 
decision of whether to terminate the pregnancy. However, the later 
codification of the case in section 7962 is silent as to the intended 
parents’ rights throughout gestation.133 
California Family Code section 7962 sets forth the contractual 
elements necessary to establish legal parentage of the child.134 
Importantly, the statute is silent as to the intended parents’ relationship 
to the fetus during gestation, and only concerns the custody of the 
resulting child.135 The statute does not expressly confer a right to make 
procreative decisions throughout the gestational period to the intended 
parents.136 This may be construed to mean that the intended parents’ 
rights regarding the child do not materialize until the birth of the child, 
and consequently, the power to decide whether to terminate the 
pregnancy remains with the surrogate. However, given the lack of 
clarity on the matter, the statute sheds little light as to whether the 
 
 130. Id. at 89. 
 131. Id. at 90. 
 132. Id. at 93. 
 133. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2019). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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intended parents retain the power of procreative decision making. 
Consequently, this analysis turns on whether the state may 
constitutionally enforce the intended parents’ decision on the matter. 
d.  A surrogate’s procreative autonomy and bodily integrity 
The position of the intended parents in this scenario can be 
likened to that of a pregnant woman’s spouse seeking to veto an 
abortion, as both parties may attempt to assert their right to procreate. 
As noted, the California Supreme Court held in Lungren that a statute 
that restricts a pregnant individual’s ability to decide on her own 
whether to continue or to terminate her pregnancy unquestionably 
implicates a constitutionally protected privacy interest.137 By 
categorically striking down any statute that would require spousal 
approval before abortion, it can be understood to mean that California 
courts implicitly recognized that a pregnant woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy outweighs her spouse’s right to procreate. 
Thus, it follows that a surrogate’s right to terminate her pregnancy 
should not be conditioned on the approval of the intended parents 
under California law. 
Further, the right to bodily integrity is also significant here. As 
previously discussed, surrogates face many health risks that 
accompany the complicated IVF process, in addition to those normally 
associated with pregnancy. The court in Lungren emphasized that the 
right to choose whether to “terminate a pregnancy implicates a 
woman’s fundamental interest in the preservation of her personal 
health” and “her interest in retaining control over the integrity of her 
own body.”138 Therefore, this right encompasses a surrogate’s interest 
in being free from health risks and bodily changes associated with the 
gestational surrogacy process. 
e.  Waiving procreative rights 
Intended parents in this scenario may argue that, by virtue of 
entering into a binding gestational surrogacy contract, the surrogate 
has waived her broad right to privacy as protected by the United States 
and California Constitutions. It is important to consider the underlying 
rationales applied by the federal and California courts in establishing 
 
 137. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 814 (Cal. 1997). 
 138. Id. at 813. 
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a pregnant woman’s right to an abortion. For example, in categorically 
striking down the spousal veto, the Court in Casey emphasized the 
dangers such a requirement would pose, namely, the dangers of 
domestic abuse.139 The Court noted that many women who are subject 
to psychological and physical abuse at the hands of their husbands 
have “very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands of 
their decision to obtain an abortion.”140 Importantly, the Court also 
declared that when a woman marries, she does not lose her 
constitutionally protected liberties.141 
However, these concerns may not be present in the case of 
gestational surrogacy, in which the parties have a contractual 
relationship premised on producing a child. While it is possible that a 
surrogate may suffer abuse at the hands of the intended parents, 
especially if the relationship between the parties has soured, it is less 
plausible that she has good reasons for not wishing to inform them of 
the abortion, seeing as this would effectively terminate the contractual 
relationship between the parties. Thus, an intended parent veto may 
not fall within the same vein as the spousal veto. However, it is 
important to note how such a veto power would manifest itself. 
f.  Risks of involuntary servitude 
If the intended parents are vested with a “veto” power, the 
surrogate may be forced to unwillingly carry a pregnancy to term. 
Such a situation would run afoul of public policy considerations that 
have driven concern over surrogacy contracts. 
Among other public policy arguments, the court in Johnson 
confronted the argument that gestational surrogacy contracts may 
violate “prohibitions on involuntary servitude,” contained in both the 
United States and California Constitutions.142 “Involuntary servitude 
has been recognized in cases of criminal punishment for refusal to 
work,” or compulsory service in payment of a debt.143 The Ninth 
Circuit articulated that “[t]he essence of a holding in involuntary 
servitude is the exercise of control by one individual over another so 
 
 139. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897, 901 (1992). 
 140. Id. at 893. 
 141. Id. at 898. 
 142. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 6). 
 143. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243 (1911). 
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that the latter is coerced into laboring for the former.”144 Thus, the 
freedom to choose whether or not to work is important to consider in 
determining whether involuntary servitude is at issue. 
In the context of surrogacy contracts, once the surrogate is 
impregnated, it is possible that she would choose not to complete the 
service and terminate the pregnancy. Stripping her of the choice to 
terminate the pregnancy would strip her of the freedom to choose 
whether to perform, thereby subjecting her to involuntary servitude. 
While the Johnson court found that surrogacy contracts did not 
facially violate prohibitions on involuntary servitude, it noted: 
[A]lthough at one point the contract purports to give [the 
intended parents] the sole right to determine whether to abort 
the pregnancy, at another point it acknowledges: “All parties 
understand that a pregnant woman has the absolute right to 
abort or not abort any fetus she is carrying. Any promise to 
the contrary is unenforceable.” We therefore need not 
determine the validity of a surrogacy contract purporting to 
deprive the gestator of her freedom to terminate the 
pregnancy.145 
This language, in conjunction with the court’s discussion concerning 
involuntary servitude, suggests that a surrogacy arrangement that 
deprives the surrogate of her right to terminate the pregnancy would, 
in fact, violate prohibitions against involuntary servitude. 
While the intended parents have a right to procreate, and 
California law allows them to enlist the help of surrogates in doing so, 
the competing rights of the surrogate weigh in favor of granting her 
the choice to decide whether to terminate the pregnancy. A decision 
to the contrary would violate her right to privacy, broadly protected by 
the California Constitution, and subject her to conditions tantamount 
to involuntary servitude. 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA’S GESTATIONAL 
SURROGACY STATUTORY SCHEME 
While California’s surrogacy statute legitimizes the practice of 
gestational surrogacy, it does not address any rules that may apply in 
the event of a surrogate’s termination, or refusal to terminate, the 
 
 144. United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 145. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784. 
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pregnancy.146 The parties’ contract may purport to limit such 
decisions; however, the preceding analysis demonstrates that such a 
contractual term would likely be unenforceable. Given the increasing 
popularity of assisted reproduction and recent disputes surrounding 
this issue, the California legislature should adopt a more thorough 
statutory scheme which addresses the enforceability of provisions 
regarding procreative decision making. An example of such a scheme 
can be found in the updated Uniform Parentage Act (“2017 UPA”).147 
A.  Uniform Parentage Act (2017) 
Since the UPA was originally promulgated in 1973, it has been 
updated several times.148 In 2017, the Uniform Law Commission 
updated the UPA again in light of changing familial structures.149 
Many of these changes have contributed to assisted reproductive 
technology, and the Commission modernized the UPA to address the 
resulting familial structures more thoroughly.150 
Surrogacy agreements were first recognized in the 2002 version 
of the UPA, which states were very reluctant to adopt.151 The 2002 
UPA permitted both genetic (or traditional) and gestational surrogacy, 
and regulated both types identically.152 The 2017 UPA differs by 
regulating the two practices differently and, in turn, liberalizes the 
practice of gestational surrogacy.153 As the official comment suggests, 
the updates in the 2017 version reflect developments in the practice in 
the fifteen years since the 2002 version and are intended to align with 
current practices and laws in states which permit surrogacy 
agreements.154 
1.  Rules Applicable to Breach of Surrogacy Agreement 
Significantly, the 2017 UPA is the first version to address the 
rules that apply in the event of a breach of a surrogacy agreement.155 
Section 812(c) of the 2017 UPA states broadly that if the agreement is 
 
 146. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2019). 
 147. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 148. Id. 
 149. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 1222 (8th ed. 2018). 
 150. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 151. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8, cmt. at 72 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 812, cmt. at 86 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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breached by either interested party, the “non-breaching party is 
entitled to the remedies available at law or in equity.”156 The 2017 
UPA then qualifies this by stating that “specific performance is not a 
remedy available for breach by a gestational surrogate of a provision 
in the agreement that the gestational surrogate be impregnated, 
terminate or not terminate a pregnancy, or submit to medical 
procedures.”157 
In short, the 2017 UPA would preclude a court from enforcing a 
provision requiring or precluding an abortion by ordering specific 
performance of the provision. This effectively places the ultimate 
decision whether to terminate the pregnancy with the surrogate. This 
approach is in line with the surrogate’s federal and state constitutional 
rights, as discussed above. In fact, the official commentary to the 2017 
UPA notes that a court order requiring a surrogate to terminate, or not 
terminate a pregnancy, may violate her constitutional rights.158 
Thus, the 2017 UPA should be incorporated into California’s 
statutory scheme for enforcing surrogacy agreements. This would 
ensure that the rights of surrogates are protected and lend clarity to the 
issue of procreative decision making in gestational surrogacy. 
However, this provision alone may not be enough to fully protect those 
rights guaranteed under California law. 
2.  Remedies Available at Law or Equity 
While the aforementioned provision precludes specific 
performance as a remedy and allows a surrogate to make the ultimate 
procreative decision, a problem exists in the form of the intended 
parents’ other available remedies. Section 812(c) of the 2017 UPA 
provides the intended parents with “remedies available at law or in 
equity” for breach of the contract by the surrogate.159 Several states 
that allow gestational surrogacy, including Maine and Nevada, have 
adopted identical provisions.160 Consequently, though a surrogate may 
not be ordered by a court to terminate or not terminate a pregnancy, 
she may be coerced by the threat of other available remedies. 
 
 156. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 812(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 157. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 812(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 158. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 812 cmt. at 86 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 159. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 812(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 160. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 812 cmt. at 86 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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For example, consider a surrogate who wishes to terminate her 
pregnancy in contravention of the contract and against the will of the 
intended parents. The surrogate must make the decision whether to 
terminate the pregnancy, facing the potential liability for a broad range 
of damages, such as reimbursement of medical costs or consequential 
damages. If the surrogate is unable to bear such costs, the threat of 
those damages may suffice to prevent her from obtaining the abortion. 
Consequently, by providing the intended parents with a broad range 
of remedies for breach, the UPA may inadvertently place a substantial 
obstacle in the way of the surrogate exercising her right to privacy and 
may therefore be unconstitutional. 
The California Supreme Court noted in Lungren that a California 
statute which hindered a woman’s right to obtain an abortion 
“impinges upon a fundamental autonomy privacy interest” and must 
therefore be evaluated under the compelling interest standard.161 
Under this standard, it must be demonstrated that the statute is 
necessary to further an extremely important and vital state interest.162 
Here, section 812 of the 2017 UPA, which provides damages to the 
parties after breach, arguably serves to advance the state’s interest in 
protecting the intended parents’ right to procreate, as well as the 
parents’ contractual obligations upon entering a surrogacy agreement. 
However, as previously discussed, a surrogate’s right to privacy likely 
outweighs the rights of the intended parents, and thus the state’s 
interest in protecting those rights likely does not rise to the level of 
“extremely important and vital” to justify the intrusion on the right to 
privacy. 
Accordingly, the California legislature should tailor the provision 
such that it does not bar the surrogate from obtaining an abortion. For 
example, the damages available to intended parents could be limited 
to liquidated damages and could expressly preclude liability for a 
penalty. The 2017 UPA itself does this in section 814(c), in dealing 
with termination of a genetic surrogacy agreement.163 Thus, the 
intended parents would retain a remedy for breach without 
 
 161. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 817–18 (Cal. 1997). 
 162. Id. at 819. 
 163. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 814(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (noting that “except in cases 
of fraud” the genetic surrogate is not liable for a penalty or liquidated damages for terminating the 
surrogacy agreement). 
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substantially intruding upon the surrogate’s right to privacy and 
procreative decision making. 
By adopting such rules applicable to breach of a gestational 
surrogacy agreement for a surrogate’s termination or refusal to 
terminate the pregnancy, the California legislature would bring 
security to the practice of surrogacy and protect the fundamental right 
to privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Though far from new, the practice of surrogacy remains 
controversial.164 Given the intimate nature of such arrangements, the 
disputes that arise from surrogacy agreements confront some of the 
most fundamental and contested legal rights. In considering the 
scenarios in which a surrogate seeks to terminate or refuses to 
terminate the pregnancy against the will of the intended parents, one 
must weigh the right to procreate against other vital rights, such as the 
right to privacy and bodily integrity. 
This practice has continued in California after the decision in 
Johnson and subsequent codification in California Family Code 
section 7962. While there exists a legal framework for establishing 
parentage from surrogacy arrangements, the California courts and 
legislature have yet to address the court’s ability to enforce a surrogacy 
agreement that purports to limit the surrogate’s right to choose 
whether to terminate the pregnancy. However, an examination of the 
competing rights of each party in such scenarios indicates that the 
ultimate decision should remain with the surrogate, and the state 
cannot constitutionally compel the surrogate to act either way. 
The 2017 UPA recognizes the shortcomings of previous law in 
the area and clarifies the issue of procreative rights in surrogacy 
arrangements by promulgating express rules applicable to breach of 
such agreements.165 These rules indicate that a court may not order a 
surrogate to comply with a term requiring her to terminate, or not 
terminate, a pregnancy.166 The rules do, however, provide the intended 
parents with other available remedies for the breach, which may have 
the effect of substantially deterring the surrogate’s choice in obtaining 
 
 164. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8, cmt. at 72 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 165. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 812 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 166. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 812 cmt. at 86 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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an abortion.167 Thus, California should adopt the rules promulgated by 
the 2017 UPA but limit those damages available to intended parents 
to ensure the surrogate is not coerced into complying with the contract. 
As the California Supreme Court noted in Johnson, the decision 
to enter into a surrogacy agreement is a personal economic choice on 
the part of the surrogate mother and provides a valuable option to 
wanting parents who may have no other means of producing a child of 
their own genetic stock.168 By clarifying the rights of the parties 
involved with respect to procreative decision making, the California 
legislature can further this valuable practice and protect the 
fundamental rights guaranteed to all women. 
 
 167. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 812(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 168. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993). 
